Will India Extradite Sheikh Hasina to Bangladesh?

Deutsche Welle

23 Oct 2024, 10:08

Photo: Naveen Sharma/ZUMA/IMAGO

Months after deadly unrest in Bangladesh forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to leave office and flee to India, Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal has issued an arrest warrant for the veteran leader.

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Prosecutors claim the 77-year-old Hasina is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of students and protesters this summer.

She has been ordered to appear in court on November 18. Citing alleged crimes against humanity, the tribunal directed the new Bangladeshi government to produce Hasina and 45 others charged along with her before this date.

It was reported that more than 60 complaints have been filed against Hasina and other leaders of her Awami League party for alleged enforced disappearances, murder and mass killings.

Bangladesh to activate extradition treaty
Hasina fled to India in a military helicopter on August 5 amid escalating violence that ended with more than 1,000 dead. The transitional government in Dhaka revoked her diplomatic passport soon after her escape.

Still, Indian officials continue to shelter Hasina under tight security in a safe house in the outskirts of New Delhi. Even her daughter Saima Wazed, who works in Delhi as the regional director for Southeast Asia in the World Health Organization, has not been able to see her.

India has shown no inclination to extradite Hasina to its neighbor to the east.

In Bangladesh, the interim government's legal adviser Asif Nazrul said Dhaka would strongly protest if India tried to refuse the extradition, saying New Delhi is obligated to do so under a criminal extradition treaty signed in 2013.

"India is certainly bound to return Hasina [to Bangladesh] if India honestly interprets this," Nazrul told the media last week.

However, the treaty does allow for extraditions to be refused if the offense is of "political nature."

India pursuing 'diplomatic strategy'
Officials in India's Foreign Ministry have been sidestepping questions on extradition, pointing out that the former Bangladeshi premier traveled to India for "safety reasons."

"On the stay of the former prime minister, I had earlier mentioned that she had come here at short notice for safety reasons and she continues to be here," Randhir Jaiswal, a spokesperson for the External Affairs Ministry, told reporters.

The issue has forced New Delhi into a balancing act. The Indian government realizes Hasina's presence could hamper its efforts to build strong diplomatic ties and trade relations with the new interim administration in Dhaka, but Hasina had also built up excellent ties with India during her time in office.

"India's decision regarding Sheikh Hasina must balance legal obligations, humanitarian principles and strategic interests. The key considerations include legal assessment, human rights obligations and diplomatic strategy," Karan Thukral, an Indian Supreme Court lawyer specializing in extradition matters, told DW.

Fight between law and diplomacy
According to Thukral, India has the option to refuse the extradition request, especially if there are credible concerns about charges being politically motivated and potential judicial proceedings in Bangladesh being unfair.

"In matters of extradition, especially involving political figures, it's imperative that we uphold the sanctity of legal principles over expedient diplomacy," said Thukral.

"India's response to Sheikh Hasina's situation will not only affect bilateral relations but will also reflect the country's commitment to the rule of law and the protection of fundamental human rights," said Thukral.

Hasina could challenge extradition request in court
Sreeradha Datta, a professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs, believes India will not react immediately if Bangladesh presents it with an extradition request.

"These issues take time, as technical and judicial processes are involved. But more importantly, India will have to weigh in on the political considerations surrounding such a request," Datta told DW.

India's former ambassador to Bangladesh, Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, pointed out that Hasina has legal tools of her own to fight the extradition process.

"Hasina will have the option of challenging it in court, which will take its own time," Chakravarty told DW. "Moreover, there are clauses in the treaty related to political offenses which are not extraditable. I am unsure what will finally happen but my guess is that government can refuse to extradite," he said.

Can Bangladesh afford to alienate India?
Bangladesh is India's biggest trade partner in South Asia, with bilateral trade estimated at $15.9 billion (€14.55 billion) in the fiscal year 2022-23. Under Hasina, India emerged as the foremost development partner and before her ouster, both sides were due to start negotiating a free trade deal.

In return for economic support, India was able to rely on Hasina's administration to control security risks like human trafficking, infiltration and terrorist activities along the shared border.

Since the regime change in Dhaka, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spoken with interim leader Muhammad Yunus and pledged that New Delhi will continue implementing its development projects across the border.

Yunus is now facing a balancing act of his own — pursuing what Hasina's critics see as justice for hundreds of victims, while at the same trying to preserve India's support as well as economic and political stability while moving toward new elections, which Bangladesh hopes to hold next year.

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