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Iran and Saudi Arabia Pursue Cautious Rapprochement
Kersten Knipp
10 Nov 2024, 17:28
Photo: isna
Iran and Saudi Arabia are intent on continuing their cautious course of rapprochement. After a Saudi-Iranian deal brokered by China in 2023, the erstwhile rivals want to deepen their relationship.
Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi's visit to the Saudi capital Riyadh at the beginning of October indicates that relations are developing. He also met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the de facto ruler of Saudi Arabia.
Tensions go back almost half a century
Rapprochement is a new approach for the two countries, whose relations have been considered particularly difficult since the Iranian revolution in 1979.
The tensions originated in a fundamentally different understanding of the political role of religion. After 1979, Iran's approach to Islam was from the perspective of social revolution. For a long time, it positioned itself in the region as the leader of Shiite Muslims with rebellious tendencies.
For its part, the Saudi royal family, which is Sunni, relies primarily on the role of religion to maintain its power. It bases its claim to leadership in the region on Islam and its role as the custodian of the holy sites in Mecca and Medina.
The different positions became particularly apparent during the Arab Spring protests that began in 2010 and spread around the region. Saudi Arabia was concerned that Iran would shape and instrumentalize the protest movements.
Yemen remains a source of conflict
Despite all the rhetoric about rapprochement, the two countries remain indirectly opposed to each other in Yemen, where the radical Shiite Houthi militia attempted to overthrow the government of Yemeni President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi and took control of large parts of the country.
While Iran supported the Houthis, Saudi Arabia led a coalition of predominantly Sunni states, which was also supported by the West, predominantly the US, to fight them. One of the coalition's motives was to push back against Iranian influence.
Rapprochement makes sense from Saudi perspective
Nonetheless, Sebastian Sons from CARPO, a Bonn-based think tank, believes that the current rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia has several advantages from the latter's perspective.
He told DW that after Iran attacked Saudi oil facilities in 2019, Riyadh realized that it could not completely rely on the US and would have to resolve issues with its Iranian neighbor. He added that in Riyadh, regional stability was considered a prerequisite for a successful economy, based on the one-sided dependence on oil.
"Riyadh also wants to put a definitive end to the conflict in Yemen, and in particular to the shelling of Saudi territory by the Houthis," Sons said. "In this respect, it is hoping that Iran can influence the militia."
However, Hamidreza Azizi from the Berlin-based German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), said it remained to be seen what influence Iran has on the Houthis. He told DW that it was unlikely that Iran could dictate the Houthis' every move. But he said that both Iran and the Houthis were looking out for each other's interests, and that could contribute to an ongoing cease-fire in Yemen.
Iran is pursuing its own interests
Azizi added that Iran was pursuing its concrete interests with its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia.
"Years of sanctions and economic mismanagement, corruption," had hit Iran hard, he said. "The regime has been concerned about increasing economic challenges leading to probably more severe waves of protest," adding that Iranians doubted the regime's ability to govern effectively.
He said that because Iran had not been able to reach an agreement with the West on the nuclear deal and "lift the economic sanctions," it was "looking for other ways to compensate, for example trying to integrate into multilateral organizations like BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, but also to improve relations with neighbors like Saudi Arabia."
Iran is also concerned about its security interests, Azizi explained. Even before the rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia, which was brokered by China, "there were growing signs indicating that a normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel might be imminent. […] so Iran was really afraid of the potential of an anti-Iran coalition between Arab states and Israel, and the best way that they thought could help and prevent the formation of such coalition was to reach out to Arab states themselves." He described this as "detente as deterrence."
At the moment, Saudi Arabia's normalization efforts with Israel before October 7, 2023, are no longer relevant, Azizi said, pointing out that Riyadh had spoken out in favor of a two-state solution for Israelis and Palestinians, which is currently not an option for Israel.
But he insisted that Saudi Arabia had no intention of turning against Israel or giving the impression that it is turning away from the West by moving closer to Iran. Saudi Arabia wants strategic autonomy, he said.
Saudi Arabia wants to be a mediator
For Sons, Saudi Arabia wants to be perceived as building bridges as a mediator with all players.
"Qatar performs a similar function," he explained. "Saudi Arabia has traditionally been more reserved, but now seems to be positioning itself as a player that keeps the channels of communication with Tehran open."
"Messages from the Americans to the Iranians have already been communicated via the Saudis. This will be an important part of Saudi regional policy and diplomacy in the future," Sons said.
Azizi has a similar view. He thinks that improved Iranian-Saudi relations could contribute to the region's long-term stability and that Tehran has understood that rapprochement is in the interests of all parties.
Deutsche Welle
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Will India Extradite Sheikh Hasina to Bangladesh?
Months after deadly unrest in Bangladesh forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to leave office and flee to India, Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal has issued an arrest warrant for the veteran leader.
Prosecutors claim the 77-year-old Hasina is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of students and protesters this summer.
She has been ordered to appear in court on November 18. Citing alleged crimes against humanity, the tribunal directed the new Bangladeshi government to produce Hasina and 45 others charged along with her before this date.
It was reported that more than 60 complaints have been filed against Hasina and other leaders of her Awami League party for alleged enforced disappearances, murder and mass killings.
Bangladesh to activate extradition treaty
Hasina fled to India in a military helicopter on August 5 amid escalating violence that ended with more than 1,000 dead. The transitional government in Dhaka revoked her diplomatic passport soon after her escape.
Still, Indian officials continue to shelter Hasina under tight security in a safe house in the outskirts of New Delhi. Even her daughter Saima Wazed, who works in Delhi as the regional director for Southeast Asia in the World Health Organization, has not been able to see her.
India has shown no inclination to extradite Hasina to its neighbor to the east.
In Bangladesh, the interim government's legal adviser Asif Nazrul said Dhaka would strongly protest if India tried to refuse the extradition, saying New Delhi is obligated to do so under a criminal extradition treaty signed in 2013.
"India is certainly bound to return Hasina [to Bangladesh] if India honestly interprets this," Nazrul told the media last week.
However, the treaty does allow for extraditions to be refused if the offense is of "political nature."
India pursuing 'diplomatic strategy'
Officials in India's Foreign Ministry have been sidestepping questions on extradition, pointing out that the former Bangladeshi premier traveled to India for "safety reasons."
"On the stay of the former prime minister, I had earlier mentioned that she had come here at short notice for safety reasons and she continues to be here," Randhir Jaiswal, a spokesperson for the External Affairs Ministry, told reporters.
The issue has forced New Delhi into a balancing act. The Indian government realizes Hasina's presence could hamper its efforts to build strong diplomatic ties and trade relations with the new interim administration in Dhaka, but Hasina had also built up excellent ties with India during her time in office.
"India's decision regarding Sheikh Hasina must balance legal obligations, humanitarian principles and strategic interests. The key considerations include legal assessment, human rights obligations and diplomatic strategy," Karan Thukral, an Indian Supreme Court lawyer specializing in extradition matters, told DW.
Fight between law and diplomacy
According to Thukral, India has the option to refuse the extradition request, especially if there are credible concerns about charges being politically motivated and potential judicial proceedings in Bangladesh being unfair.
"In matters of extradition, especially involving political figures, it's imperative that we uphold the sanctity of legal principles over expedient diplomacy," said Thukral.
"India's response to Sheikh Hasina's situation will not only affect bilateral relations but will also reflect the country's commitment to the rule of law and the protection of fundamental human rights," said Thukral.
Hasina could challenge extradition request in court
Sreeradha Datta, a professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs, believes India will not react immediately if Bangladesh presents it with an extradition request.
"These issues take time, as technical and judicial processes are involved. But more importantly, India will have to weigh in on the political considerations surrounding such a request," Datta told DW.
India's former ambassador to Bangladesh, Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, pointed out that Hasina has legal tools of her own to fight the extradition process.
"Hasina will have the option of challenging it in court, which will take its own time," Chakravarty told DW. "Moreover, there are clauses in the treaty related to political offenses which are not extraditable. I am unsure what will finally happen but my guess is that government can refuse to extradite," he said.
Can Bangladesh afford to alienate India?
Bangladesh is India's biggest trade partner in South Asia, with bilateral trade estimated at $15.9 billion (€14.55 billion) in the fiscal year 2022-23. Under Hasina, India emerged as the foremost development partner and before her ouster, both sides were due to start negotiating a free trade deal.
In return for economic support, India was able to rely on Hasina's administration to control security risks like human trafficking, infiltration and terrorist activities along the shared border.
Since the regime change in Dhaka, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spoken with interim leader Muhammad Yunus and pledged that New Delhi will continue implementing its development projects across the border.
Yunus is now facing a balancing act of his own — pursuing what Hasina's critics see as justice for hundreds of victims, while at the same trying to preserve India's support as well as economic and political stability while moving toward new elections, which Bangladesh hopes to hold next year.
Is There a Future for Central Asia’s Indian Ocean Transport Projects?
Central Asian countries are actively exploring new trade routes that could connect them to the Indian Ocean, focusing on partnerships with Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. These routes offer the potential for expanded economic ties with India, the Gulf states, and even East Africa, promising new opportunities for regional trade. However, the realization of such ambitious projects is fraught with political challenges. Ongoing geopolitical tensions, internal instability, and security concerns in key transit countries pose significant hurdles.
Difficult Choices
Central Asian countries face two main options for accessing the Indian Ocean: through Iran or through Afghanistan in order to gain access to Pakistani ports. The key challenge is the presence of political conflicts along both routes, especially against the backdrop of escalating tensions in the Middle East. On the surface, the deterioration of relations between Iran and Israel casts doubt on the further implementation of the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC). Similarly, the situation regarding Pakistani ports is equally uncertain. Central Asian nations, particularly Uzbekistan, are promoting the Trans-Afghan railway to gain access to Pakistani ports, as it would enable connection to the Persian Gulf countries, which are actively advancing their own cooperation frameworks with Central Asian countries and are ready to expand investment and economic partnerships.
Additionally, the construction of the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway will provide Uzbekistan with the opportunity to become a Eurasian logistics hub.
However, the current situation in Pakistan presents difficulties to realizing the full potential of these projects. The trade route through Pakistan, particularly via the Gwadar and Karachi ports, faces its own set of challenges. The domestic political situation in Pakistan remains unstable, with occasional instances of anti-Chinese terrorism, exemplified by the October 2024 attack near Karachi’s Jinnah International Airport. Such security threats undermine investor confidence and complicate the development of Pakistani ports, making them less attractive to Central Asian countries seeking reliable access to the Indian Ocean.
Moreover, Pakistan’s difficulties regarding trade with Central Asian states have been exacerbated by confrontations between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad Abbas Stanikzai urged Pakistan not to block Afghan agricultural exports during the harvest season, threatening that the Taliban could shut down the transit of Pakistani goods to Central Asia.
The Afghanistan-Pakistan Transit Trade Agreement, signed in 2010, allows for the transit of Afghan goods through Pakistani ports. Trade between Pakistan and Afghanistan has declined over the years due to border tensions and restrictions, dropping from $2.5 billion in 2010 to $1.8 billion in 2022-23. Afghanistan’s reliance on Pakistani ports for its international trade has been affected by these disputes. The closure of key border crossings like Torkham has resulted in significant financial losses for traders on both sides. Consequently, Afghanistan has sought alternative trade routes, such as the Chabahar Port in Iran, to reduce its dependence on Pakistani ports. This move is seen as a strategic shift to bypass Pakistan and access global markets.
How Central Asian States Address These Challenges
One example of how a Central Asian state is managing the emerging conflicts in Iran and Pakistan is offered by Kazakhstan’s policy. At this stage, Kazakhstan supports the implementation of two transport routes through Afghanistan: the Trans-Afghan railway “Termiz-Mazar-i-Sharif-Kabul-Peshawar” and “Herat-Kandahar-Spin Boladak.” Kazakhstan intends to execute the first project alongside Uzbekistan and the second with Turkmenistan. The second project provides Kazakhstan with a strategic opportunity to redirect part of its traffic to Iranian ports in the event of a conflict on the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.
During the implementation of this project, there is the possibility of directing cargo from Kandahar to Afghanistan’s Farah, then to Zaranj on the border with Iran, and subsequently to Iranian ports. Afghanistan is actively utilizing these routes due to conflicts along its border with Pakistan. Since the beginning of 2023, when Pakistan introduced stricter conditions for Afghan transit trade, including increased import tariffs and the requirement of 100 percent bank guarantees, Afghan traders have been actively seeking alternative routes through Iran. In October 2023, Pakistan imposed new taxes and restricted the transit of certain goods, leading to significant financial losses for Afghan traders. These measures resulted in an increase in the number of containers delayed at Karachi port, affecting the freshness of perishable goods and other products. Afghanistan has invested $35 million in developing the Chabahar Port in Iran to reduce its dependence on Pakistan.
Overall, it is crucial for Central Asian countries to have as many options as possible to expand their economic ties. Therefore, routes through Iran within the framework of the INSTC are also of great interest.
The Promise of the INSTC
Initiated in 2000 by India, Iran, and Russia, the INSTC has evolved into a genuine multilateral integration initiative. Over the years, its membership has expanded to include the Central Asian countries of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, with Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan expressing interest in joining. The corridor’s strategic significance lies in its potential to offer a 30 percent cheaper and 40 percent shorter alternative to the Suez Canal route, reducing transit times from 45-60 days to 25-30 days.
For the energy-rich Central Asia states, the INSTC offers a lifeline that can help diversify their export markets. It provides access to the Indian Ocean, enabling these landlocked nations to reach Southeast Asian markets. Despite its promise, the INSTC faces significant political headwinds. The escalating confrontation between Iran and Israel poses a direct threat to the corridor’s stability. Recent events, such as Israel’s killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Iran’s retaliatory missile strikes, have intensified security dilemmas in the Middle East. These tensions risk embroiling Iran in a broader conflict, potentially leading to disruptions along the INSTC routes passing through Iranian territory.
Western sanctions against Iran and Russia further complicate matters. These sanctions limit both countries’ access to global financial markets, hindering infrastructure development and deterring potential investors. The sanctions regime not only affects Iran’s ability to participate fully in the INSTC but also impacts the willingness of other countries to engage with Iran, amid fears of secondary sanctions.
However, it is important to consider the active development of relations between the Gulf countries and Iran. Following a meeting with a Qatari delegation at the Iran Expo 2024 international exhibition, Iran’s Minister of Industry Abbas Aliabadi expressed both sides’ interest in implementing joint investment projects. It is anticipated that the countries will finance mutually beneficial initiatives and enterprises in the fields of industry, agriculture, logistics, and infrastructure in Africa and Asia, as well as in Iraq and Afghanistan. Against this backdrop, Central Asian countries could also be sufficiently involved in implementing Iran-Qatar joint investment projects.
In March 2023, Saudi Arabia and Iran agreed to resume diplomatic ties under a China-brokered deal, ending a seven-year rupture. This agreement aimed to ease tensions in the Persian Gulf and facilitate high-level diplomatic exchanges. Despite the normalization agreement, tensions remain due to ongoing regional conflicts, particularly in Yemen and Lebanon. Saudi Arabia is concerned about Iranian influence in these regions. Recent diplomatic efforts include a visit by Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi to Saudi Arabia in October 2024 to discuss attacks in Gaza and Lebanon, indicating a cautious approach to improving relations. Additionally, Kazakhstan and Iran are discussing joint ventures in logistics and transportation. For example, a joint venture with Abu Dhabi Ports is planned to facilitate the delivery of agricultural goods through Iranian ports. This initiative demonstrates some Gulf states’ desire to contribute to connectivity with Central Asia through Iranian ports. Against this backdrop, another major player interested in developing ties with Central Asian countries – India – also emerges.
India’s Strategic Imperatives
For India, the INSTC is more than just a trade corridor; it’s a strategic asset. By providing a route to Central Asia, via Iran, that bypasses Pakistan, the INSTC aligns with India’s broader goals of enhancing connectivity and counterbalancing China’s growing influence through the Belt and Road Initiative. The corridor also offers India direct access to energy resources in Central Asia, crucial for meeting its burgeoning energy needs.
India has been proactive in promoting the INSTC, organizing meetings with member countries and investing in infrastructure projects such as Iran’s Chabahar Port. The port serves as a pivotal node in the INSTC, offering India a foothold in the region and a gateway to Afghanistan and beyond.
Despite the challenges, there are signs of progress. In July 2022, the INSTC commenced operations through its eastern route, linking Russia, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Iran to India. The inaugural shipment demonstrated the corridor’s viability, reinforcing its potential to handle between 14.6 and 24.7 million tonnes of freight annually by 2030. This capacity would account for over 70 percent of all container traffic between Eurasia, Central Asia, the Gulf region, and South Asia.
The recent diplomatic rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia also offers advantages. Improved relations could lead to increased investments and cooperation, bolstering the INSTC’s development. The INSTC holds significant promise for energy trade between India and Central Asia. By providing direct access to energy-rich nations like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, the corridor could help India bridge its energy demand-supply gap. The Ashgabat Agreement further enhances this potential by facilitating connectivity and promoting the use of existing land routes, such as the Kazakhstan-Turkmenistan-Iran railway.
Mitigating Risks and Charting the Path Forward
The future of Central Asia’s Indian Ocean transport projects depends on the region’s ability to navigate geopolitical tensions, security challenges, and economic uncertainties. To address these risks, Central Asian countries must embrace regional cooperation, diversify their trade routes, and build strategic partnerships. Developing multiple transport corridors, such as enhancing both Iran-based routes within the INSTC framework and the Trans-Afghan railway, will ensure greater resilience against disruptions. Strengthening collaboration among Central Asian states through joint infrastructure investments and harmonized trade regulations can create a more stable and unified trading environment.
Building robust partnerships with key regional and global players like India, the Gulf states, and China is essential for supporting Central Asia’s connectivity ambitions. India’s investment in the INSTC and projects like the Chabahar Port highlights the importance of such alliances. Additionally, investing in modern transportation infrastructure and improving security measures will enhance the efficiency and reliability of new trade routes, attracting more investment and fostering economic growth.
(Source: The Diplomat)
India’s Diaspora in the Gulf: A Catalyst for Global Influence
India’s global diaspora has long been a cornerstone of its international influence, with over 18 million Indians living and working in countries around the world. While this community thrives across continents, the Gulf countries have become particularly important, serving as a vibrant hub for millions of Indian expatriates. In nations like the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar, Indians are not just contributing to the economies of their host countries but are also playing a pivotal role in enhancing India’s global standing. As India’s journey toward becoming a new superpower unfolds, its diaspora in the Gulf countries is increasingly recognized as a crucial component in this ascent.
The Indian expatriate community in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is estimated to number over eight million, representing one of the largest and most significant diaspora groups in the region. This community has grown dramatically over the past few decades, driven by economic opportunities in sectors such as construction, healthcare, hospitality, and finance. The contribution of Indian professionals, laborers, and entrepreneurs to the region’s infrastructure development, business ecosystem, and service industries has been profound.
In the UAE alone, Indians make up approximately 30% of the total population, and in countries like Oman and Qatar, they constitute a significant part of the workforce. What sets the Indian diaspora in the Gulf apart is its diversity: while a large proportion works in blue-collar jobs, an increasing number of Indian professionals are rising to prominent positions in business, finance, technology, and healthcare. From managing multi-billion-dollar companies to leading critical infrastructure projects, the Indian presence is felt at all levels of the Gulf economy.
The financial remittances sent back to India by Gulf-based Indians have been instrumental in supporting India’s economy. In 2022, India received an estimated $100 billion in remittances, with a large share coming from the Gulf region. These remittances have played a vital role in bolstering India’s foreign exchange reserves, stabilizing its currency, and supporting the livelihoods of millions of families back home.
However, beyond the sheer economic contribution, the Indian diaspora in the Gulf has also facilitated stronger trade and investment ties between India and the GCC. Indian entrepreneurs and business leaders in the Gulf have been key to attracting investments into India’s infrastructure, technology, and real estate sectors. These investments not only strengthen bilateral relations but also contribute to India’s broader economic growth and ambition to become a global manufacturing and innovation hub.
As India’s stature rises on the global stage, its diaspora in the Gulf plays a critical role in projecting its soft power. Indian cultural and social organizations in the Gulf promote India’s rich heritage, from Bollywood cinema to classical arts, further enhancing India’s global image. Indian festivals such as Diwali and Holi are celebrated with great enthusiasm in cities like Dubai and Muscat, underscoring the deep cultural ties between India and the Gulf nations
Moreover, the presence of influential Indian leaders in the Gulf’s corporate and political spheres has helped amplify India’s voice in international forums. India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi has made strengthening ties with the Gulf a priority, resulting in increased collaboration on issues like energy security, counter-terrorism, and technology. Indian expatriates often serve as informal ambassadors, fostering goodwill and contributing to the robust diplomatic relationships that India enjoys with Gulf states.
India’s growing influence in the Gulf is not just about economics and culture—it has significant strategic implications for India’s rise as a global power. The Gulf is one of the world’s most important geopolitical regions, home to vast energy reserves and critical maritime routes. India’s close ties with Gulf countries ensure access to crucial energy supplies, which are vital for its growing economy.
Furthermore, India’s strategic partnerships with Gulf nations, fostered in part by its diaspora, have enhanced its standing in international platforms such as the G20 and the United Nations. India’s leadership in these forums, as seen during its G20 presidency, is amplified by the strong relationships it maintains in the Gulf, making the diaspora a key asset in India’s diplomatic toolkit.
The Indian diaspora in the Gulf is a dynamic and integral part of India’s global identity. Their contributions to both their host countries and to India itself are significant, extending beyond remittances and economic ties to include cultural influence and diplomatic engagement. As India continues its ascent on the global stage, its Gulf diaspora will remain a critical force in shaping the country’s path toward becoming a true global superpower.
India’s diaspora is not merely an extension of its population; it is an active participant in its global aspirations, reflecting and amplifying the country’s ambitions in new and unprecedented ways. Through its people, India is cementing its position as a rising power, with the Gulf serving as a critical partner and platform for its growing global influence.
(Source: Khaleej Times)
UN Rights Body Concerned at Internet/Social Media Blackouts in Pakistan
The UN Human Rights Committee also called the Committee on Civil and Political Rights (CCPR) on rights violations and raised concerns at the social media surveillance, internet and social media apps blockage to maneuver general elections, religious intolerance, ban on student unions as well as curbs on the media and freedoms of expression and movement.
This happened on the second day of the review of human rights conditions in Pakistan in a meeting in Geneva on Friday.
Questions were raised by the UN committee chair on curbs on freedom of association, saying “according to information received the legislative framework at the federal and provincial levels imposes unnecessary barriers to exercise this right. We have seen in many areas the NGOs have their finances and plans inspected and all this is being used to interfere in the work of some NGOs. There are many reports that national as well international NGOs are subjected to constant investigation and harassment on the part of security operators and govt officers.”
She asked about the measures being taken for a conducive environment for the NGOs to work independently as well as laws to remove the rules that hinder their freedom of association.
The committee chair said student unions had been prohibited for more than 40 years.
“University students have to sign a sworn declaration where they reject any political activity as a basis for prerequisite for admission to a university. Similarly, Pashtun and Baloch students are subjected to arbitrary disciplinary hearings and suspensions given their political activity.” She asked about the measures to remove the prohibition on student unions and creating a conducive environment for student unions.
Child rights and anti-rape laws
The committee noted the low level of birth registration in Pakistan, saying only 42 pc of children under 5 had registered birth.
A committee member raised the matter of the recent alleged rape incident of a private college girl, saying that despite claims of anti-rape laws for protection of women, there was a recent incident of rape of a girl at the ‘Punjab Girls College’ and that the procedures were ignored there.
“What measures will the state party take to ensure that that law is properly implemented to avoid political interference?” she asked.
“The committees on juvenile justice are not operational which means there are limited operation on juvenile justice or those in police custody who have no capacity to pay for their bail. There is an absence of rehabilitation centres and programmes that violate the juvenile justice.”
A committee asked about the progress made to modify the legislation to stop the child marriages 1929 law to change the minimum age for marriage to 18 years, raising questions about the non-implementation of an order passed by the Lahore Court, ruling that the minimum age should be increased to 18 years.
Hindu and Christian girls’ conversion
The UN committee raised the issue of forced conversions, expressing shock at the magnitude of cases of Hindu and Christian girls abducted or obliged to convert to Islam, marry their abductors or relatives.
The committee rejected the number of cases to be 74 as reported by the state party, saying the actual number was much more. “Sometimes these cases don’t even reach courts and when they do, the girls are not sent back to their families but to their abductors or sent to shelter most of them don’t have necessary conditions to protect these victims. Some of these girls are exposed to sexual exploitation.”
Religious intolerance and blasphemy
A committee member pointed out that religious minorities such as Shia Muslims, Christians, Ahmadis, Hindus and Sikhs were subject to frequent attacks and threats, including accusations of blasphemy, targeted killings, lynchings, mob violence, forced conversions and desecration of places of worship.
“The society has become increasingly intolerant of religious diversity. The minorities are facing a constant threat of persecution and discrimination amid the rise of religious radicalism.”
She said the criminal law amendment act of 2023, instead of curbing sectarianism, had increased persecution of minorities and minority sects by increasing punishment for using derogatory remarks against holy persons from three years jail to life imprisonment.
“We received information two days back that Rabwa secretary of general affairs and Chiniot district administration had been informed that if Islamic signs are not removed from religious places of Ahmadis by Oct 28, the TLP would take action on its own.” The committee sought information on amendment of blasphemy law to prevent misuse of blasphemy laws.
Freedom of movement and expression
The UN rights body raised the matter of freedoms of movement and expression and the authorities’ use the exit control list to restrict freedom of movement to suppress dissent.
A member said that critics of government and human rights defenders, including Mama Qadeer, Mahrang Baloch, had faced unjustified travel restrictions. The application of restrictions must be based on clear legal grounds. The committee raised concerns at the passport applicants to obtain declaring their religion especially Ahmadi applicants required to identify as non-Muslims to obtain passports.
The committee stressed that defamation laws should be carefully implemented so that they don’t stifle freedom of expression and that imprisonment was never an appropriate penalty for defamation.
“Defamation remains a criminal offence in the PPC and the Prevention of Electronic Crime Act with penalty of imprisonment and fines.
Punjab Defamation Bill 2024 passed without stakeholders consultations raises concerns as it emphasizes prosecuting public officials and allows fine without proof of actual damage which can lead to repression or intimidation.“
It sought review of defamation provisions to align with international laws.
Curbs on the media and self-censorship
A committee member referred to the reports of Pemra exceeding its mandate and using directives as tools for censorship of journalists and media outlets and suspension of licences of news channels.
This concern has been exacerbated by the amendment to Pemra Amendment Bill which introduces definition of misinformation that may enable censorship under the guise of giving authentic news.
“Despite the enactment of protection of journalists and media professionals act three years ago implementation remains weak and commission required under the act is yet to be established. Threats, harassment, abduction violence enforced disappearances and killing of journalists are rampant, leading to self censorship.” He asked about safety measures in place for journalists and human rights defenders.
Internet outages and online surveillance
A UN committee member referred to the censorship including the frequent outages and blockage of social media apps or slower connectivity raises serious concerns about information control and violation of freedom of expression.
“In May 2023 protests, there were four days of internet blackout and social media shutdown followed by frequent outages and restrictions continuing until general elections which prevented voters from accessing polling information and limiting communication.”
She said the Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (Peca) grants authorities power to charge individuals, particularly young people, with blasphemy based on digital media.
“It makes online defamation of authorities a crime, it allows authorities to block content and law enforcement to collect without a warrant and allows data sharing with foreign governments without legality.
We know that the intelligence service was granted power this year to conduct surveillance for national security. We have multiple examples of Peca being used for unlawful surveillance.“ She raised concerns about involvement of the cyber crime wing of the FIA in charging hundreds of young people with blasphemy based on social media content. It sought information, if any, to review the discretionary powers of surveillance to the state agencies
Bonded labour issue
The UN rights committee said that more than three million Pakistanis were trapped in forced labour, servitude and bonded labour, particularly in the farming sector, brick kilns and domestic work.
“After the floods of 2022, more people, particularly children, have been forced to work despite the national and provincial laws. How the state intends to control the menace and the steps taken to combat the forced labour and conditions of servitude including among children particularly in context of the climate change.” She also asked about the measures taken to curb the advance payment that often leads to servitude and sexual exploitation of children. She asked whether labour inspectors have got resources to carry out investigations effectively.
The Pakistani delegation, headed by Malik Muhammad Ahmad Khan, presented a report on the state of human rights in the country and replied to some of the questions raised by the committee during the review under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).
Pakistan ratified the ICCPR in 2010 and the first review took place in 2017. It was the second one of the review on Friday.
(From Dawn)
Battling Acute Malnutrition in Pakistan
In a world wracked by conflict, severe food shortages, climate catastrophes and poorly funded healthcare systems, it is little wonder that wasting, or acute malnutrition, continues to pose a grave threat to the lives of millions of children worldwide.
This was highlighted in some detail by Unicef’s dire warning issued on October 15, revealing that globally nearly two million children suffering from severe wasting –- defined as low-weight-for-height due to inadequate and poor quality food intake -– are at risk of death due to funding shortages for life-saving Ready-to-use-Therapeutic-Food (RUTF) to treat acute malnutrition.
Alarmingly, Pakistan is among the 12 hardest hit countries in this regard as it could run out of its stock of the vital RUTF by March next year if efforts to replenish the supply of this critical resource aren’t taken immediately.
Out of the 786,000 children suffering from acute malnutrition in the country, only about one-third have received the RUTF treatment, leaving 524,000 children still at considerable risk to their lives.
The crisis appears particularly acute in Sindh as around 98 percent of children under two years of age in the province are not receiving the minimum acceptable diets required for growth and development, according to information shared by Unicef back in August.
For acutely malnourished children, RUTF –- a nutrient-rich paste that treats severe wasting in children under five –- is crucial for their survival and recovery, and to ensure its steady supply, governmental health bodies, both at the federal and provincial levels must spring into action to secure the $11.9 million funding required to acquire 300,000 cartons of this essential item to address its shortage, and then maintain glitch-free distribution channels countrywide.
Apart from this much-needed urgent step, what is also clearly required are longer term measures that go to the root of the crisis, so that severe wasting among children can be prevented from raising its ugly head in the first place. The fact remains that malnutrition among children can be directly traced back to lack of proper maternal nutrition, something which is fundamental to both maternal and child well-being.
Children born to malnourished mothers are at greater risk of acute malnutrition, cognitive limitations, weakened immunity, and a higher likelihood of illness and mortality throughout their lives. According to figures cited in Pakistan Maternal Nutrition Strategy 2022-27, 18 percent of married women of reproductive age suffer from nutrient deficiencies, leading to 44 percent of children experiencing stunted growth.
From insufficient household food security and poor access to quality healthcare, to food systems that are clearly falling short in delivering sufficient and diverse diets for women and children, these factors are collectively exacerbating the malnutrition crisis.
On top of that, patriarchal structures prevalent in many households ensure that there is discrimination in the way food and resources are allocated to women and girls. Ultimately, it is poverty, gender inequality, low education levels, and the limited autonomy of women in making decisions regarding their reproductive health that serve as significant barriers to addressing acute malnutrition.
In order to overcome the challenge posed by severe wasting among children, a multi-faceted approach is essential. Apart from strengthening access to quality healthcare services to provide critical maternal and child health support, urgent efforts are required to improve access to nutritious foods by enhancing local food systems and agricultural practices in order to ensure food security at the household level.
It is also important to realise that promoting education, particularly for women and girls, empowers families to make informed dietary and life choices. Finally, addressing gender inequality and ensuring equitable distribution of resources can significantly improve nutrition outcomes, which can help foster a healthier future for our children.
(Source: Business Recorder)
BRICS Model: An Alternative to Western Hegemony
From October 22–24, 2024, the BRICS summit in Kazan, Russia, has launched a new chapter in world politics. Over time, additional nations have joined the BRICS alliance, giving it worldwide influence. Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, and the UAE joined the alliance, pushing it to six from five: South Africa, Brazil, Russia, India, and China. BRICS has grown beyond an economic partnership, indicating political, economic, and geopolitical power.
The rise of BRICS has polarised world politics. The West has traditionally dominated the world's economy and politics. Western rules govern the World Bank, IMF, and WTO, which the US and Europe lead.
In contrast to this hegemonic framework, the BRICS and other Global South members want to strengthen and gain autonomy. The BRICS group wants a more varied global economy and less Western financial domination. Russia and China have vocally opposed the US-led system, while Brazil and India have taken a more moderate approach. Despite these conflicts, the alliance has developed a new development strategy that may challenge Western supremacy.
Many more individuals joined the BRICS due to its expansion. The BRICS Plus population is over 46% of the world total, more significant than the Group of 7. This worldwide alliance is growing economically and threatening the Group of Seven in politics and strategy. Despite challenges, progress has occurred. Member states' differing strategic and political viewpoints threaten the treaty's coherence. Russia and China have vocally opposed Western supremacy, while India and Brazil have maintained more moderate and diplomatic relations. Coalition disagreements and lack of consensus may ensue.
The BRICS development model threatens Western economic supremacy.
The Western model prioritizes profit and the market, whereas the BRICS model emphasizes cooperation, sustainability, and local capacity. BRICS countries are strengthening their social and economic systems as part of their development efforts. This strategy aims to become self-sufficient by utilizing local resources, creating a long-term economic basis via international partnerships, and helping poor countries.
Economic autonomy is becoming increasingly vital to BRICS countries. The ongoing attempt to establish SWIFT-competitive payment systems is one example. It would allow Moscow to trade with allies and avoid Western sanctions. BRICS members are also launching new measures to boost trade and economic integration. Russia and China have increased strategic cooperation despite Western sanctions. Significant development. Thus, economic and geopolitical divisions against Western unilateralism have emerged.
The Western alliance worries about the BRICS' expansion and Russia-China rapprochement. Western analysts worry about Xi Jinping's close relations with Vladimir Putin and the BRICS' growth under his leadership. Putin and Xi proclaimed a "borderless partnership" in 2022 before invading Ukraine to strengthen their strategic position against Western sanctions. Putin and Jinping's rapprochement at the summit showed they're ready to challenge American supremacy. Political, military, and economic cooperation is essential. Russia and China seek to use the BRICS alliance to take over Global South states and enhance their collaboration against Western powers.
BRICS development arose in resistance to Western domination. However, all member states will need hard work, thoughtful planning, and cooperation to fulfill their aims. After decades of Western dominance in global politics and economics, BRICS and other alternative models may usher in a new age. Once subject to Western political control, BRICS may protect the advancement of the Global South. However, this partnership has challenges. Divergent perspectives, tactics, and internal issues will make BRICS unity difficult. Time will tell how the bloc's competitive rivalry and partnership with the West develops.
To counter Western domination, the BRICS development model was created. It allows southern countries strategic and economic sovereignty. The alliance's internal issues and global political context need member governments to cooperate and demonstrate political will to succeed. The BRICS alliance might move global power away from the West towards a more cooperative, multilateral, and sustainable global economy, allowing South countries more excellent voices over their future.
The writer is the former Chairman, Department of International Relations, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh and Non-resident Fellow, Hong Kong Research Center for Asian Studies (RCAS)
The Israeli-Iranian Conflict: A Pathway to Regional Warfare
Israel launched a counterattack a few weeks after Iran's October 1 strike. In retaliation for Israel's brutal assaults on Gaza and Lebanon, as well as the assassinations of leaders of Hamas and Hezbollah, Iran has launched approximately 200 missiles against Israel.
The most recent confrontation between Iran and Israel is, first and foremost, a war between two nations; second, it may have ramifications for the whole Middle East. In what it saw as a self-defense operation, Israel recently attacked Iran, killing four of its troops. Iran, on the other hand, has said it will continue to resist Israeli attacks on Gaza, Lebanon, and its people.
This situation indicates a long-term regional conflict in the Middle East that could cause deep concern to the international community. It is the first time Israel has accepted responsibility for the attack on Iran, and Defense Minister Benjamin Netanyahu approved the plan at a cabinet meeting. Israeli media reported that Iran had been warned before the attack.
However, despite the warning, Iran did not react. Instead, the attack created more tension. Israel claims its attack was only on military installations. However, this is not just a retaliatory move; Israel's primary goal is to signal to Iran that Israel is ready to counter any Iranian military action. Such an aggressive move would not only escalate the Iran-Israel conflict but could lead to a broader war.
Iran has directly denied the Israeli attack and has made it clear that it is committed to resisting Israeli attacks on territories it supports, including Gaza and Lebanon. Iran's commitment shows that its response encompasses not only Israel but the entire region. The White House spokesman said the United States was not directly involved in the attack. However, US foreign policy has been made abundantly clear in Israel's recent strategy.
The visit of US Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken to Israel and Saudi Arabia was a pivotal moment preceding the conflict. The situation in the Middle East has become more heated after the disclosure of secret US-Israeli joint strategy documents on the strategy to attack Iran. The assault on Iran occurred promptly following Blinken's visit, leading to the inference that the incident is linked to his trip to Israel. Despite this declaration, many people think that without the direct or indirect support of the United States, Israel could not have played such a bold role in carrying out the attack.
This ongoing tension between Israel and Iran will not be limited to their bilateral conflict but could spill over into the broader Middle East. The crisis was exacerbated by Israeli military operations against Iran amid anti-Hamas and Hezbollah operations. It may not be limited to the conflict between Iran and Israel but may have broader regional implications.
Especially if significant powers such as China and Russia get involved in the conflict, the possibility of a terrible humanitarian catastrophe is high. In this situation, if countries such as Egypt, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia fail to take any action to bring peace to the region, the entire Middle East may become involved in an inevitable war. Meanwhile, the ceasefire brokered by Egypt once again proves that Arab countries are still optimistic about peace in the Middle East.
The assault by Israel on Iran not only intensifies the existing tensions between the two nations but also engenders the potential for a protracted crisis throughout the entire region. Israel's attack on Iran not only exacerbates the Israel between the two countries but also creates the possibility of a long-term crisis in the entire region. Although this attack is limited to military installations, the consequences could be more profound.
The Middle East will be rugged if the conflict spreads and other countries become involved. The situation will become more complicated if powers such as the United States and Russia play a more active role in resolving the conflict. The invasion of Iran, supported by the United States and executed by Israel, has not merely impeded the progress of peace negotiations in the Middle East; it is also steering the region towards an impending and extended conflict.
The writer is the former Chairman, Department of International Relations, University of Chittagong, Bangladesh and Non-resident Fellow, Hong Kong Research Center for Asian Studies (RCAS)
