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Trump vs. Harris: What's at Stake for Bangladesh?
International Desk
06 Nov 2024, 08:33
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Many analysts believe that the outcome of the U.S. election, whether it’s Kamala Harris or Donald Trump, could significantly impact Bangladesh. This discussion has intensified, particularly after a tweet from Republican candidate Donald Trump.
In the past, U.S. politicians, especially Democrats, have shown strong ties with Dr. Muhammad Yunus, the Chief Advisor of the Bangladesh government. A Democratic administration typically emphasizes democratic processes and human rights worldwide. If Kamala Harris or the Democrats come to power, experts anticipate smoother business and cooperation opportunities for Bangladesh.
According to Michael Kugelman, a South Asia expert and author at the Wilson Center, if Kamala Harris wins, the current U.S.-Bangladesh relationship may continue as it is. However, he cautions that a Trump presidency could change this dynamic. Kugelman notes that Bangladesh is one of the South Asian countries where the U.S. election outcome could have a significant impact on bilateral relations.
Former Bangladeshi Ambassador to the U.S., M. Humayun Kabir, expressed concern that a Trump victory could reduce U.S. humanitarian aid globally, which could have consequences for Bangladesh, particularly on issues like the Rohingya crisis, as a large portion of U.N. aid for the Rohingyas in Bangladesh comes from the U.S.
Historically, Donald Trump has not been seen as a conventional U.S. president. His approach to foreign policy often creates uncertainty. Usually, a change in U.S. presidency doesn’t bring drastic shifts in foreign policy, thanks to strong institutional structures, notes Dr. Mehnaz Momen, a professor at Texas A&M University. However, Trump has sometimes suggested altering institutional structures, which could lead to a significant shift, though Momen remains skeptical about how much this would impact foreign policy.
Recently, a Trump tweet regarding minority oppression has sparked discussion in Bangladesh, but analysts view it more as a strategy to appeal to Hindu voters in the U.S. than a signal of future policy.
Chief Advisor’s Press Secretary Shafiqul Alam mentioned that certain lobby groups might have influenced this statement, hinting that this might refer to Awami League or India. In previous Bangladeshi elections, U.S. support initially leaned toward a firm stance on election credibility, but later, India’s backing of the Bangladeshi government became a critical factor.
Former ambassador Kabir notes that India might play a role in Bangladesh’s bilateral relations if Trump wins, particularly given Trump’s strong ties with Prime Minister Narendra Modi. This could create concerns for Bangladesh if its relationship with India remains strained, as U.S. foreign policy often views Bangladesh through an Indian lens.
If Kamala Harris wins, due to her favorable ties with Dr. Yunus, there could be greater friction between U.S. and Indian perspectives on Bangladesh, Kugelman suggests.
Bangladesh’s potential role as a rising market has also attracted U.S. interest in areas like major power equipment, Boeing aircraft, and gas or LNG supply. Many Bangladeshis live, study, and work in the U.S., highlighting a valuable people-to-people relationship.
Analysts believe that Bangladesh’s future relations with the U.S. will be influenced by various factors, including the U.S.’s evolving geopolitical interests in South Asia and its connection with Dr. Yunus. Ultimately, a range of factors will shape the future of U.S.-Bangladesh relations.
(Source: BBC)
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Emergence of a New Indo-Maldives Strategic Dynamic
India and the Maldives have recently redefined their bilateral relationship, transforming it into a Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership during a meeting between Prime Minister Narendra Modi and Maldivian President Mohamed Muizzu on October 7, 2024. This partnership covers various areas, including economic cooperation, maritime security, development initiatives, and political engagement, signaling a positive shift after periods of tension.
Reset in Relations
President Muizzu’s initial “India Out” campaign, which sought the withdrawal of Indian military personnel and stirred anti-India sentiments, had strained relations. However, his recent visit to India from October 6–10, 2024, marked a diplomatic reset. Recognizing the need for cooperation amid an economic crisis, Muizzu sought India’s support, acknowledging India as the Maldives’ "closest friendly country and neighbor."
Several agreements were signed during his visit, including currency swaps and development projects, further solidifying the new strategic partnership. Modi’s warm reception and Muizzu’s willingness to collaborate demonstrate a pragmatic shift in the Maldives' foreign policy.
Comprehensive Economic and Maritime Security Partnership
This new partnership aims to foster cooperation in maritime security, economic development, infrastructure, and political engagement. The Maldives' strategic location in the Indian Ocean makes maritime security a key focus. Joint efforts will ensure the safety of vital trade routes, contributing to regional stability.
India remains a significant development partner, offering support in health, education, infrastructure, and disaster management. The partnership also emphasizes boosting bilateral trade and investment through collaborations in tourism, fisheries, and transportation infrastructure.
Strengthening Development and Defence Cooperation
India has committed to several major development projects, including the Greater Male Connectivity Project and building bridges, airports, and social housing units. During Muizzu’s visit, the inauguration of the Hanimaadhoo International Airport runway and the handover of 700 social housing units were celebrated. Additionally, India provided financial assistance through a $400 million currency swap agreement and $100 million treasury bills rollover, supporting the Maldives' economic stability.
On the defense front, India agreed to refit the Maldivian Coast Guard Ship Huravee free of charge, enhancing maritime cooperation. These efforts align with India’s strategy to strengthen regional security partnerships.
Focus on Governance, Education, and Digital Services
India and the Maldives aim to improve governance through digital cooperation, modernizing financial systems, and enhancing public services. India has also supported education by offering scholarships and training programs. In addition, the two countries engage in joint marine scientific research, focusing on conservation and sustainable use of marine resources.
Key Agreements and Their Impact
The two leaders signed five significant agreements, including those related to judicial training, corruption prevention, law enforcement, and youth affairs. These agreements reflect both countries' commitment to enhancing governance and mutual cooperation. The launch of the RuPay card in the Maldives will further facilitate seamless financial transactions between the two nations.
Regional Implications and Future Prospects
The strengthened India-Maldives relationship is expected to have broader regional impacts. Enhanced maritime security cooperation will benefit the Indian Ocean region by ensuring stability along critical trade routes. This dynamic partnership may also influence the strategies of external powers like China and the U.S., compelling them to recalibrate their regional engagements.
The focus on economic growth and development projects could open new opportunities for trade and investment across South Asia, potentially encouraging neighboring countries to pursue similar partnerships for their own economic benefit.
President Muizzu has invited Modi to visit the Maldives in 2025 to commemorate the 60th anniversary of diplomatic relations, signaling a future of deeper cooperation. As both countries continue to engage through high-level exchanges, the Indo-Maldives strategic partnership is poised to strengthen further, fostering stability, growth, and mutual prosperity in the region.
This evolving partnership not only cements India’s influence in the Indian Ocean but also demonstrates the Maldives’ commitment to regional collaboration, setting the stage for long-term bilateral success.
(Source: Times of Oman)
Warming Vietnam-China Ties: Hugging a Wolf in Panda’s Clothing
Vietnam’s national identity has long been shaped by its struggle against Chinese domination. For over a millennium, various Chinese dynasties ruled Vietnam, leaving an enduring sense of insecurity. This historical “millennium of grievance” has profoundly influenced Vietnam’s strategic thinking, reinforcing concerns about threats from the north. Even Vietnam’s term for “country” (đất nước) emphasizes land (“đất”) before water (“nước”), reflecting a traditional focus on land-based threats despite its maritime geography.
Though Vietnam and China share Communist ideologies, their relationship has evolved beyond ideology. Three decades after the Cold War, both countries maintain party-to-party ties, but these exchanges now focus more on strategic reassurance than ideological alignment. Tensions over issues such as the South China Sea persist beneath the surface of their diplomatic engagements.
Strategic Reassurance Amid Historical Tensions
The recent elevation of Tô Lâm as the Vietnamese Communist Party’s new General Secretary underscores a tightening alignment with China. Tô Lâm’s first state visit after his appointment was to Beijing on August 19, 2024, where Chinese President Xi Jinping emphasized the “strategic significance” of bilateral relations. His leadership mirrors Xi’s focus on national security and strengthens anti-corruption campaigns that consolidate political power.
This growing alignment requires setting aside contentious issues like the South China Sea disputes. Lâm’s cozying up to Beijing allows both countries to downplay differences for now, especially given China’s simultaneous pressure on the Philippines over maritime claims. However, the deep-rooted mistrust between the two nations has not disappeared—Vietnamese leaders remain cautious about Beijing’s intentions.
Economic Cooperation with Limits
Vietnam’s relationship with China is shaped by pragmatic interests, but tensions remain. China’s economic influence comes with political risks, as Beijing’s control over trade and infrastructure projects leaves Hanoi concerned about economic dependency. While Vietnam benefits from Chinese trade, investments, and infrastructure initiatives, it has also canceled oil and gas projects under Chinese pressure, incurring nearly $1 billion in compensation to foreign firms.
China’s illegal, unregulated fishing (IUU) activities and maritime restrictions force Vietnamese fishermen to venture farther south, complicating Vietnam’s fishing industry. Additionally, Vietnam accuses China’s upstream damming of the Mekong River of exacerbating saline intrusion and drought in the Mekong Delta, adding to local farmers' frustrations.
Managing Maritime Conflicts
Despite the diplomatic warm-up, maritime disputes remain unresolved. Vietnam refuses to drop its sovereignty claims over the Paracel and Spratly Islands and has intensified land reclamation efforts in the South China Sea. While China tolerates these moves for now, tensions could easily resurface. Unlike the Philippines, which challenged China’s maritime claims through international arbitration, Vietnam pursues a quieter strategy, balancing cooperation with resistance.
The complexity of Vietnam-China relations lies in their evolution from hostility to cautious friendship. Though the two nations share Communist roots, Hanoi increasingly views Beijing’s policies as driven by national interests rather than ideology. While ideological conservatives in Hanoi advocate for socialist solidarity, nationalist elites recognize that China’s geopolitical ambitions pose a long-term threat.
Domestic Implications of Economic and Cyber Misconduct
Vietnam’s challenges with China extend beyond the maritime domain. Chinese criminal syndicates operating out of Sihanoukville, Cambodia, have entrapped Vietnamese nationals in forced labor schemes disguised as job opportunities. Disturbing videos of victims swimming across the border to escape these operations have gone viral, further straining public perceptions of China.
Strategic Balancing Act
Although the warming ties between Vietnam and China seem beneficial for both parties, Hanoi remains wary of falling too deeply into Beijing’s orbit. Vietnam’s leadership is acutely aware that allowing foreign military bases on its soil would provoke China, complicating regional security dynamics. For Vietnam, maintaining its sovereignty and autonomy remains a top priority.
Beijing’s growing economic influence over Hanoi, combined with historical grievances, fuels anxiety among Vietnamese leaders about vulnerabilities in defense and trade. China’s relentless push for dominance in the South China Sea makes clear that neither ideology nor economic interdependence can temper its geopolitical ambitions. Vietnam, historically invaded multiple times from the sea, views maritime security as central to its national strategy.
Conclusion
Though Beijing and Hanoi project an image of solidarity, the relationship remains fragile. Vietnam’s long-term goal is to reclaim lost maritime territories, and its leaders know that China will not relinquish its ambitions. As Tô Lâm navigates this delicate partnership, he may soon discover that China is more wolf than panda—disguising strategic ambitions beneath friendly overtures.
US Lawmakers, Scholars Sound Alarm Over CCP Propaganda in Universities
Concerns are mounting over the use of Chinese Communist Party (CCP) propaganda materials in American universities. These materials, often embedded in Chinese language and cultural programs, align with the CCP’s political agenda, raising questions about academic freedom, transparency, and students' perceptions of China. Critics argue that such resources are part of Beijing’s broader strategy to project soft power and shape global narratives through education.
Propaganda in Academic Materials
A recent controversy centers around a textbook titled Discussing Everything Chinese, widely used in Chinese language courses at major US universities, including Yale University and San Francisco State University. Researcher Cynthia Sun from the Falun Dafa Information Center uncovered that the book promotes anti-Falun Gong rhetoric, reflecting the CCP’s long-standing persecution of the spiritual practice.
Falun Gong, a meditative practice rooted in Buddhist traditions, promotes truth, compassion, and forbearance. After it gained massive popularity in China during the 1990s—reportedly attracting between 70 to 100 million practitioners—the CCP, under Jiang Zemin’s leadership, initiated a brutal crackdown in 1999. Since then, Falun Gong practitioners have been subjected to severe repression, including detention and torture.
The presence of such CCP-backed narratives in academic settings has sparked criticism from lawmakers, scholars, and advocacy groups, who see it as an attempt to normalize Beijing’s authoritarian policies under the guise of education.
Lawmakers Demand Action
During the recent event “Back in Class: Foreign Funding & Malign Influence on US Higher Education,” held at the International Spy Museum in Washington, Sun raised the issue with Rep. John Moolenaar (R-Mich.), chairman of the House Select Committee on the CCP. Moolenaar acknowledged the deceptive nature of China’s efforts to influence sectors across the US, including universities. He emphasized the need for transparency and accountability in educational materials, suggesting that oversight through federal hearings and public awareness would be key.
“What China is doing is really trying to infiltrate every aspect of the private sector, universities, and culture—and they’re being very deceptive about it,” Moolenaar warned. While legislative action is one avenue, he stressed that much of the response will involve raising awareness and ensuring that problematic materials are identified and removed.
Challenges to Academic Freedom
The discovery of CCP-backed content raises serious concerns about academic freedom. Universities, traditionally seen as spaces for free inquiry and critical thinking, risk compromising these values by allowing biased materials into their curricula. The use of educational resources produced by Chinese state-controlled publishers reflects the CCP’s influence in shaping narratives, often framing China’s governance and history in ways that align with the regime’s propaganda.
The reliance on such materials limits students' exposure to diverse perspectives, promoting a one-sided understanding of Chinese politics and society. Some academics may even engage in self-censorship to avoid upsetting Chinese authorities, fearing restrictions on travel or access to research opportunities in China. This atmosphere discourages open discussion on politically sensitive topics, further narrowing the range of viewpoints available to students.
The Broader Soft Power Push
The use of CCP-backed educational content in American universities is part of China’s larger soft power campaign. Through cultural diplomacy, language programs, and partnerships with foreign institutions, the Chinese government seeks to shape global perceptions of its political system and promote its model of governance.
In the US, these efforts involve subtle integration of pro-CCP narratives into academic programs, influencing how future leaders, policymakers, and scholars view China. The normalization of these narratives risks legitimizing China’s authoritarian system while obscuring the CCP’s ongoing human rights abuses and censorship practices.
Protecting Educational Integrity
The growing influence of Chinese government-backed programs underscores the importance of vigilance in academic institutions. Universities must ensure that educational content reflects a diverse range of perspectives and does not serve the interests of authoritarian regimes. Transparency in funding sources and greater scrutiny of curricula are essential to safeguarding academic integrity.
While educational exchange is valuable for fostering mutual understanding between nations, the introduction of biased content undermines the very principles of higher education. As Rep. Moolenaar noted, public awareness will play a crucial role in curbing the influence of CCP propaganda. Ensuring that students are exposed to objective, balanced narratives is essential for maintaining the credibility of American academic institutions.
This issue highlights the need for ongoing oversight of foreign-funded educational programs. By remaining vigilant, universities can better protect academic freedom and critical thinking, ensuring that students receive an education free from foreign political interference.
(Source: The Singapore Post)
Held at Dragonpoint: Impeding Democracy in BRI Nations
The Belt and Road Initiative (“BRI”) was launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping of China and since then has become one of the largest infrastructure projects in the word. The BRI was first introduced in Kazakhstan with the land-oriented Silk Road Economic Belt and in Indonesia with the sea-oriented Maritime Silk Road. Over the years China has expanded its infrastructural development strategy and as of July 2023, official Chinese announcements state that 149 countries (including China) have joined the BRI. 44 countries from Sub-Saharan Africa are a part of BRI and form the highest number of participating members from a region.
While the initial purpose of BRI was to boost economic development and increase regional connectivity, many scholars believe BRI to be a key element China’s multi-faceted geostrategic policy. The BRI’s geographic scope includes nations already struggling to curtail public sector corruption and to develop resilient democratic institutions. An aggressive Chinese debt-funding patronage has resulted in impeding democracy in BRI countries and has reinforced autocracies.
The Democracy Index 2023, which measures the democracy level in a country based on the electoral process and pluralism, functioning of government, political participation, political culture and civil liberties, highlighted worsening democracies in several countries. While it does not analyse the impact of BRI on regressive democracies, it reports that more than 40% of the 44 countries in Sub-Saharan Africa and significant portions of the Middle East and North Africa noted a decline in their democracy scores which coincide with ongoing BRI projects in these regions. Similarly, Pakistan, which has been actively developing the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor with Beijing, has also experienced the biggest regression in Asia, downgrading itself from a “hybrid regime” to an “authoritarian regime”.
Investments via BRI
Through the BRI Projects, China aims to propel the ‘Chinese Dream’ of pushing “socialism with Chinese characteristics”, by increasing market access for Chinese companies, gaining control of strategically significant infrastructure and increasing its overall political influence around the world. Chinese state-owned enterprises have been reported to extend loans to fund BRI projects in participating nations rather than developmental grants, whereby failure to repay has entrapped the receiving country in costly debt-traps. Theorists believe that these grants and any Chinese BRI-related FDI volumes are positively related to a host country’s institutional fragility and low income as compared to general Chinese investments that are mostly prevalent in high-income countries.
BRI policies also tend to facilitate FDI in countries with weaker rule of law and less government accountability. In 2018, Djibouti, Montenegro, Pakistan and several other states were at risk of debt distress from BRI commitments. Other key examples like the Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, apprehension over Iran and China’s strategic and economic partnership and a Chinese-built highway in Montenegro that significantly increased the country’s national debt highlight China’s intrusion into national affairs of countries.
These intrusions essentially allow Beijing to leverage and force economic and political concessions to strengthen its geostrategic stand. Host governments often face pressure to reduce welfare spending, lower wages, and weaken labour standards as a consequence. As they compete for foreign investment, policies are shaped to attract Chinese investors and corporations, prioritizing their interests over accountability to the electorate.
As an example, in July 2016, Hungary and Greece blocked any direct reference to China in an EU statement about the ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration that struck down its legal claims in the South China Sea. Additionally, in March 2017, Hungary too refused to sign a joint letter denouncing the reported torture of detained lawyers in China, breaking the EU’s cohesive response. Some countries in Asia and Africa are also eager to adopt Chinese support to contribute to global power shifts by weakening the former colonial powers of the West.
China-linked Human Rights abuses in BRI countries
Several journalists and human rights investigators have reported declining human rights in BRI countries. A notable example is observed in Xinjiang, Kazakhstan which is considered as a historical gateway to Eurasia. Since the launch of BRI in 2013, Xinjiang authorities, with Chinese government support, have implemented “reeducation” and anti-Islamic programs targeting minority groups like the Uighur Muslims. Leaked Chinese government documents, satellite imagery, and testimonies from former detainees provide evidence of the existence of camps that violate human rights. Despite this, Chinese officials claim these camps are merely schools aimed at combating terrorism and religious extremism dismissing reports as “fake news”.
The Chinese government has also provided significant infrastructure funding through the BRI without enforcing adequate standards to protect vulnerable communities, often in concert with authoritarian governments. The construction of these large-scale infrastructure projects is regularly complemented with suppressing opposition, silencing critical civil society groups and controlling media criticism.
In Cambodia, the Chinese state-owned electricity company China Huaneng Group (“CHNG”) constructed the Lower Sesan 2 dam project as part of the BRI without community consultation and adequate relocation and compensation. Nearly 5000 indigenous people and ethnic minorities were displaced without proper resettlement. This incident sparked debates over the negligence of the Cambodian government at the behest of CHNG. Officials ignored communal concerns and objections on river ecology, impact on local fisheries and environmental concerns such as flooding. Moreover, it failed not only to provide adequate compensation but also adequate dispute resolution and grievance redressal mechanism. As such, no “free, prior and informed consent” of the affected indigenous people was obtained, as specified under the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
Similar concerns were raised in Guinea, where the construction of the Souapiti Dam devastated lives and food security in the region. There is no evidence that China required Chinese or Cambodian companies involved in dam construction to follow international corporate social responsibility standards, provide fair compensation for damages, or adhere to the standards applicable within China. Furthermore, the Chinese government has not ensured that companies involved in large-scale BRI projects conduct proper social and environmental impact assessments, nor does it consult with affected local communities meaningfully during the planning and construction phases. Another instance has been noted whereby Metallurgical Corporation of China (MCC) employees working in Imperial Pacific’s casino in Saipan reported human rights abuse, citing forced labour, human trafficking and failure to compensate for physical injury in addition to underpayment and violating federal immigration and employment laws.
Increased Instances of state surveillance in BRI countries
An alarming trend has also emerged whereby many participating countries are actively imitating the Chinese model of repression of free speech, less democratic accountability and Chinese-inspired cybersecurity laws. China has been selling surveillance technology to Belt and Road partners, many of whom misuse these systems. Beyond providing technology, China promotes digital authoritarianism by training governments on monitoring and controlling their populations. A 2018 study revealed that at least 18 countries, including Rwanda and Venezuela, use Chinese-made surveillance systems, and 38 have Chinese telecom infrastructure 36 countries have received training on Chinese-style media control, including censorship disguised as public opinion management.
For instance, following Chinese cybersecurity training in 2017, Vietnam enacted a law mirroring China’s, and similar restrictive laws have emerged in Uganda and Tanzania. Through these efforts, China is enabling governments to commit human rights abuses in the digital age.
The primary usage of these surveillance models has also been seen in Zimbabwe and Venezuela, which are noted to have received a commercialised version of China’s ‘Great Firewall’. France’s Le Monde newspaper reported large volumes of data being transferred from the Chinese-installed servers in the African Union’s headquarters in Addis Ababa to unknown servers hosted in Shanghai every night between January 2012 to January 2017. While China denied the data theft and surveillance allegations, it is believed that the African Union kept the Chinese surveillance secret for a year after discovering it.
Initiatives like the Digital Silk Road further enable digital authoritarianism by exporting Chinese hardware, software and services for a more controllable, government-led internet. Arabic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Morocco are actively adopting the Chinese tech-authoritarian model. Examples from Egypt show how Chinese surveillance equipment from Dahua and Hikvision were used to monitor and track Uyghurs in the region. In 2019, the Uzbekistan government procured 883 surveillance cameras for the “safe city” in Tashkent to “digitally manage political affairs”.
Conclusion
The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has transformed from an economic and infrastructural project into a multifaceted geopolitical strategy, significantly expanding China’s influence globally. While the initiative has facilitated large-scale infrastructure projects in many developing countries, it has also been linked to the erosion of democratic institutions that includes widespread human rights abuses, debt traps and state surveillance. Countries participating in the BRI often face increased pressure to accommodate Chinese interests, leading to reduced government accountability, weakened labour laws, and the suppression of civil liberties. The use of Chinese surveillance technology and the export of digital authoritarianism have further entrenched autocratic regimes, allowing for tighter government control and diminished freedoms. The spread of Chinese surveillance models and cybersecurity laws in regions like Africa, Asia, and the Middle East reflects a broader pattern of authoritarian governance enabled by China’s technology exports and training programs. Many countries have adopted policies that closely mirror China’s, demonstrating the growing influence of Beijing’s political model. These developments challenge the global democratic order by promoting a government-led, highly controlled internet infrastructure.
Ultimately, while the BRI is achieving its goal of expanding China’s economic reach and market access, its broader impact raises significant concerns about the future of governance, democracy, and human rights in participating nations. As more countries adopt Chinese practices of surveillance, censorship, and authoritarian control, the global community must confront the long-term implications of the BRI on political freedoms and international human rights standards.
(From 'The PML Daily')
Pakistan’s CII: Championing Oppression at Home and Abroad
In an interesting move that has puzzled human rights advocates and religious freedom supporters worldwide, Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology (CII) – a constitutional body tasked with advising the government on Islamic issues – has praised China’s treatment of Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang as a paragon of religious liberty. This endorsement comes from the very same institution that routinely advocates for intensified persecution of Pakistan’s own religious minorities, particularly the Ahmadi Muslim community.
The Council’s recent actions highlight a disturbing pattern of supporting authoritarian control over religious expression, both domestically and internationally. The Council recently dispatched an 11-member delegation to China, including a visit to the Xinjiang region, at the invitation of the Chinese government. Upon their return, the Council’s chairman, Dr. Muhammad Ragheb Hussain Naeemi, made a series of startling declarations. He asserted that Muslims in Xinjiang have achieved “economic and religious freedom” thanks to Chinese policies, and went on to commend China for purportedly eradicating extremism and terrorism in the region.
This rosy assessment stands in contrast to the findings of governments, human rights organizations, and international bodies worldwide. Extensive documentation has revealed China’s systematic campaign of mass detention, pervasive surveillance, forced labor, and cultural suppression targeting Uyghurs and other Muslim minorities in Xinjiang. Many experts and governments have characterized these actions as genocide or crimes against humanity. The willingness of Pakistan’s Council of Islamic Ideology to parrot Chinese propaganda raises serious questions about its integrity, independence, and true purpose.
The Council’s controversial stance on Xinjiang, while alarming, is hardly surprising given its history of advocating for regressive and discriminatory policies within Pakistan. Established as a constitutional body in 1962, the Council has increasingly become a platform for hardline clerics to push their agenda under the guise of official religious guidance. Its 20 members, predominantly religious scholars from conservative backgrounds, wield significant influence despite their recommendations not being legally binding.
In recent years, the Council has repeatedly called for harsher treatment of Ahmadi Muslims, a minority sect that Pakistan declared non-Muslim by constitutional amendment in 1974. The persecution of Ahmadis in Pakistan is already severe, with the community facing legal, social, and economic discrimination. Yet, the Council consistently pushes for even more draconian measures.
A recent example of the Council’s extremism came after Pakistan’s Supreme Court ruled that Ahmadis could at least practice their faith inside their homes and places of worship. The Council protested vehemently, issuing a statement that shocked many for its blatant disregard for basic human rights. It demanded that Ahmadis “must not be allowed to profess or preach in any manner even within their houses, community centers or in places of worship” and should be “unequivocally declared as apostates.” Such rhetoric from an official government body not only serves to further marginalize an already persecuted minority but also potentially incites violence against them.
The Council’s extremist positions extend far beyond targeting Ahmadis. It has consistently opposed legislation aimed at protecting women’s rights and combating domestic violence. In a particularly controversial move, the Council argued that girls as young as nine years old can be married, drawing widespread condemnation from child rights activists and progressive elements in Pakistani society. Perhaps most infamously, the Council suggested that husbands should be allowed to “lightly beat” disobedient wives, a recommendation that sparked outrage both domestically and internationally.
In the realm of economics, the Council has made equally outlandish proposals. It once called for abolishing Pakistan’s paper currency system in favor of gold and silver coins, a suggestion that economists dismissed as impractical and potentially disastrous for the country’s already fragile economy. These examples illustrate the Council’s tendency to prioritize a narrow, fundamentalist interpretation of Islamic law over practical considerations and modern human rights standards.
While the Council’s recommendations are not legally binding, its constitutional status lends significant weight to its pronouncements. This often leads to confusion among the public and provides ammunition to extremist elements within Pakistani society. Critics argue that the Council has become a tool for hardline clerics to legitimize their regressive agenda, using the veneer of official religious guidance to push Pakistan towards greater conservatism and intolerance.
The Council’s praise for China’s Uyghur policies reveals a deeply cynical worldview – one in which religious freedom is defined not by the ability of individuals to practice their faith freely, but by the power of the state to control and dictate religious expression. By endorsing China’s approach, the Council tacitly admits that its vision for Pakistan is one of authoritarian control over religious life rather than true pluralism and tolerance.
This stance is particularly troubling given Pakistan’s own struggles with extremism, sectarian violence, and the persecution of religious minorities. Instead of promoting interfaith harmony and protecting the rights of all citizens, the Council of Islamic Ideology appears more interested in exacerbating these problems. Its willingness to turn a blind eye to the well-documented oppression of Muslims in China, while simultaneously advocating for oppression at home, exposes the hollowness of its claims to defend Islam and Muslim interests. The Council’s actions also highlight the complex and often contradictory nature of Pakistan’s foreign policy, particularly its relationship with China.
As a self-proclaimed Islamic republic, Pakistan often positions itself as a defender of Muslim rights globally. However, its strategic and economic ties with China have led it to remain conspicuously silent on the plight of Uyghurs. The Council’s endorsement of Chinese policies in Xinjiang takes this silence a step further, actively legitimizing oppression in the name of combating extremism.
Calls for reform or abolition of the Council have grown louder in recent years, with some parliamentarians and civil society activists arguing that it has outlived its purpose. They point out that Pakistan already has a parliament and judiciary capable of ensuring that laws comply with Islamic principles, making the Council redundant at best and harmful at worst. However, dismantling or significantly reforming the Council faces significant obstacles.
Religious conservatives in Pakistan view the body as a crucial safeguard against secularization and Western influence. Any attempt to limit its powers or alter its composition is likely to be met with fierce resistance from Islamist parties and their supporters. As Pakistan grapples with the challenges of the 21st century – including economic development, social cohesion, and regional stability – the role of institutions like the Council of Islamic Ideology becomes increasingly questionable. Its recent endorsement of China’s policies in Xinjiang, coupled with its history of promoting discrimination and intolerance at home, suggests that it is more of an obstacle to progress than a force for positive change.
(From 'Greek City Times')
China’s Economic Slowdown Triggers Urgent Stimulus Calls
China’s industrial output growth slowed to a five-month low in August, while retail sales and new home prices weakened further, bolstering the case for aggressive stimulus to shore up the economy and help it hit its annual growth target.
The sluggish data released on Saturday echoed soft bank lending figures on Friday, underscoring weak growth momentum of the $18.6 trillion economy, the world’s second-largest, in the third quarter. Industrial output in August expanded 4.5% year-on-year, slowing from the 5.1% pace in July and marking the slowest growth since March, data from the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed on Saturday.
That missed expectations for 4.8% growth in a Reuters poll of 37 analysts. Retail sales, a key gauge of consumption, rose only 2.1% in August despite the summer travel peak, decelerating from a 2.7% increase in July. Analysts had expected retail sales, which have been anaemic this year, to grow 2.5%.
“The momentum is slowing down…The bottleneck remains domestic demand,” said Xing Zhaopeng, ANZ’s senior China strategist. China’s oil refinery output fell for a fifth month while crude steel output in August fell 6.1% from July, suggesting disappointing demand. Faltering Chinese economic activity has already prompted global brokerages to scale back their 2024 China growth forecasts to below the government’s official target of around 5%. The economy grew by 4.7% in the second quarter.
“The Q3 GDP is likely to be lower than Q2 based on current data flows. We expect large-scale stimulus to come soon,” said Xing. President Xi Jinping urged authorities on Thursday to strive to achieve the country’s annual economic and social development goals, state media reported, amid expectations that more steps are needed to bolster a flagging economic recovery.”As we are already toward the tail-end of the third quarter, time is running low for policymakers to introduce measures to buoy the economy amid numerous headwinds,” said Lynn Song, chief China economist at ING.
The protracted property slump has led to Chinese consumers cutting back on spending. Some experts have even proposed distributing shopping vouchers to counter the trend. Premier Li Qiang said last month the country will focus on stimulating consumption and look at measures to boost household income. A central bank official said last week China still has room to lower the amount of cash banks must hold as reserves while it faces some constraints in cutting interest rates.
No Property Sector Rebound
Fixed asset investment rose 3.4% in the first eight months of 2024 from the same period a year earlier, compared with an expected 3.5% expansion. It grew 3.6% in the January to July period. Liu Aihua, spokesperson of NBS, said at a press conference on Saturday that China’s economic operations remained stable, but high temperatures and natural disasters affected growth last month. Cash-strapped local governments issued bonds at a quicker pace in August for construction of major projects, with Liu saying the quickening bond issuance and policy initiatives will support investment growth.
However, the troubled property sector remains a major drag on growth. China’s new home prices fell at the fastest pace in more than nine years in August. Only two of 70 surveyed cities reported home prices gains both in monthly and annual terms in August. Property sales and investment slumped in the first eight months of the year. To aid the housing market, China may cut interest rates on over $5 trillion in outstanding mortgages as early as this month, according to Bloomberg News.
While Beijing has ramped up efforts to rescue the housing market, many analysts say much more aggressive steps are needed to help debt-laden developers and encourage would-be home buyers back to the market. Some other economic indicators released on Saturday too were unflattering. China’s nationwide survey-based jobless rate climbed to 5.3% in August from 5.2% in the previous month, the NBS said, adding that more college graduates entered the job market to hunt offers. The one bright spot for China recently has been exports, but analysts are not sure for how long the trend of rising exports will continue, given the increasing trade tensions with some countries and regions.
Zhiwei Zhang, chief economist at Pinpoint Asset Management, said investors will shift focus and wonder what will happen to growth in 2025.”Will the tight fiscal policy stance continue into next year, when global growth will likely slow down and put pressure on China’s exports?,” Zhang said. China’s economy slowed in August, with factory output, consumption, and investment all underperforming expectations. The jobless rate hit a six-month high, raising concerns about meeting the annual growth target. The broad slowdown has darkened the economic outlook, prompting calls for stronger policy measures as the year-end approaches.
Raymond Yeung, ANZ’s chief economist for Greater China, stated that August’s data essentially eliminates the possibility of achieving the 5% growth target for 2024 without a significant stimulus package. Home prices dropped at the fastest rate since 2014, indicating weak confidence and the risk of deflation. Despite multiple rate cuts, borrowing remains sluggish, reflecting poor consumer and business sentiment. This bleak data suggests that authorities need to take decisive action to revive growth. Lynn Song, ING’s chief economist for Greater China, noted that with the third quarter nearly over, time is running out for policymakers to implement measures to support the economy amid various challenges.
Before Saturday’s release, global banks like JP Morgan Chase already predicted China’s GDP would hit the lower end of Beijing’s target. Economists urged more action to avoid stagnation similar to Japan’s “lost decades.” The latest data underscores their concerns, showing even resilient sectors are slowing. Industrial output grew slower than expected, marking a four-month weakening streak, the longest since September 2021. This suggests the main economic drivers, exports, and government support, are losing momentum amid rising trade tensions.
ING’s Ms. Song noted that while external demand might hold up for a bit longer, incoming tariffs and slowing global momentum warrant caution. She highlighted that the auto sector could shift from a positive to a negative force, as car output dropped 2.3% in August year-on-year. State-driven investment has been slowing, but the private sector’s decline is more pronounced, with private investment falling 0.2% year-on-year from January to August, marking its first decline this year.
During a press conference, the National Bureau of Statistics highlighted the tough external environment and weak domestic demand. Spokesperson Liu Aihua pointed to new college graduates as a factor in the rise of urban unemployment in August. On Friday, the People’s Bank of China announced plans to intensify efforts against deflation and introduce new policies to boost the economy, a rare move alongside credit data release. A day earlier, President Xi Jinping urged officials to diligently implement current economic policies to meet annual development goals.
(From The Hong Kong Post)
Will India Extradite Sheikh Hasina to Bangladesh?
Months after deadly unrest in Bangladesh forced Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina to leave office and flee to India, Bangladesh's International Crimes Tribunal has issued an arrest warrant for the veteran leader.
Prosecutors claim the 77-year-old Hasina is responsible for the deaths of hundreds of students and protesters this summer.
She has been ordered to appear in court on November 18. Citing alleged crimes against humanity, the tribunal directed the new Bangladeshi government to produce Hasina and 45 others charged along with her before this date.
It was reported that more than 60 complaints have been filed against Hasina and other leaders of her Awami League party for alleged enforced disappearances, murder and mass killings.
Bangladesh to activate extradition treaty
Hasina fled to India in a military helicopter on August 5 amid escalating violence that ended with more than 1,000 dead. The transitional government in Dhaka revoked her diplomatic passport soon after her escape.
Still, Indian officials continue to shelter Hasina under tight security in a safe house in the outskirts of New Delhi. Even her daughter Saima Wazed, who works in Delhi as the regional director for Southeast Asia in the World Health Organization, has not been able to see her.
India has shown no inclination to extradite Hasina to its neighbor to the east.
In Bangladesh, the interim government's legal adviser Asif Nazrul said Dhaka would strongly protest if India tried to refuse the extradition, saying New Delhi is obligated to do so under a criminal extradition treaty signed in 2013.
"India is certainly bound to return Hasina [to Bangladesh] if India honestly interprets this," Nazrul told the media last week.
However, the treaty does allow for extraditions to be refused if the offense is of "political nature."
India pursuing 'diplomatic strategy'
Officials in India's Foreign Ministry have been sidestepping questions on extradition, pointing out that the former Bangladeshi premier traveled to India for "safety reasons."
"On the stay of the former prime minister, I had earlier mentioned that she had come here at short notice for safety reasons and she continues to be here," Randhir Jaiswal, a spokesperson for the External Affairs Ministry, told reporters.
The issue has forced New Delhi into a balancing act. The Indian government realizes Hasina's presence could hamper its efforts to build strong diplomatic ties and trade relations with the new interim administration in Dhaka, but Hasina had also built up excellent ties with India during her time in office.
"India's decision regarding Sheikh Hasina must balance legal obligations, humanitarian principles and strategic interests. The key considerations include legal assessment, human rights obligations and diplomatic strategy," Karan Thukral, an Indian Supreme Court lawyer specializing in extradition matters, told DW.
Fight between law and diplomacy
According to Thukral, India has the option to refuse the extradition request, especially if there are credible concerns about charges being politically motivated and potential judicial proceedings in Bangladesh being unfair.
"In matters of extradition, especially involving political figures, it's imperative that we uphold the sanctity of legal principles over expedient diplomacy," said Thukral.
"India's response to Sheikh Hasina's situation will not only affect bilateral relations but will also reflect the country's commitment to the rule of law and the protection of fundamental human rights," said Thukral.
Hasina could challenge extradition request in court
Sreeradha Datta, a professor at the Jindal School of International Affairs, believes India will not react immediately if Bangladesh presents it with an extradition request.
"These issues take time, as technical and judicial processes are involved. But more importantly, India will have to weigh in on the political considerations surrounding such a request," Datta told DW.
India's former ambassador to Bangladesh, Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty, pointed out that Hasina has legal tools of her own to fight the extradition process.
"Hasina will have the option of challenging it in court, which will take its own time," Chakravarty told DW. "Moreover, there are clauses in the treaty related to political offenses which are not extraditable. I am unsure what will finally happen but my guess is that government can refuse to extradite," he said.
Can Bangladesh afford to alienate India?
Bangladesh is India's biggest trade partner in South Asia, with bilateral trade estimated at $15.9 billion (€14.55 billion) in the fiscal year 2022-23. Under Hasina, India emerged as the foremost development partner and before her ouster, both sides were due to start negotiating a free trade deal.
In return for economic support, India was able to rely on Hasina's administration to control security risks like human trafficking, infiltration and terrorist activities along the shared border.
Since the regime change in Dhaka, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi has spoken with interim leader Muhammad Yunus and pledged that New Delhi will continue implementing its development projects across the border.
Yunus is now facing a balancing act of his own — pursuing what Hasina's critics see as justice for hundreds of victims, while at the same trying to preserve India's support as well as economic and political stability while moving toward new elections, which Bangladesh hopes to hold next year.
